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ABSTRACT
Background There has been insufficient research attention to alcohol industry methods of influencing public poli-
cies. With the exception of the tobacco industry, there have been few studies of the impact of corporate lobbying on
public health policymaking more broadly. Methods We summarize here findings from documentary analyses and
interview studies in an integrative review of corporate efforts to influence UK policy on minimum unit pricing (MUP)
of alcohol 2007–10. Results Alcohol producers and retailers adopted a long-term, relationship-building approach to
policy influence, in which personal contacts with key policymakers were established and nurtured, including when
they were not in government. The alcohol industry was successful in achieving access to UK policymakers at the
highest levels of government and at all stages of the policy process. Within the United Kingdom, political devolution
and the formation for the first time of a Scottish National Party (SNP) government disrupted the existing long-term
strategy of alcohol industry actors and created the conditions for evidence-based policy innovations such as MUP.
Conclusions Comparisons between policy communities within the United Kingdom and elsewhere are useful to the
understanding of how different policy environments are amenable to influence through lobbying. Greater transpar-
ency in how policy is made is likely to lead to more effective alcohol and other public policies globally by constraining
the influence of vested interests.
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INTRODUCTION
Alcohol industry actors may have commercial interests
distinct from, and potentially at odds with, improving
population health, yet they appear successful in position-
ing themselves as partners in policymaking processes in
wayswhichwouldnowbe inconceivable for transnational
tobacco corporations (TTCs) [1]. In comparison with
TTCs, the alcohol industry has largely managed to avoid
scrutiny of either the harms its activities cause or its
attempts to influence public policies [2]. Although this
has begun to change recently, there remains a need to
develop the evidence base on when, how and with what
degree of success alcohol industry actors attempt to influ-
ence the content of national and international policies.
Successive British governments have been strongly
criticized for according industry interests too much
weight in alcohol policymaking [3–6]. Consequently, it
has been argued, alcohol strategies in the United
Kingdom have been built around policies for which the
evidence base is weak. These criticisms have largely
stemmed from the contents of the policy documents
themselves, although elsewhere industry involvement in
policymaking has been successfully identified in other
ways [7]. Investigation of the processes by which policies
are made is necessary to determine whether and how
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far these criticisms are accurate and thus to provide a
stronger basis for countering industry influence [8].
METHODS
Investigating alcohol industry activities in the policy
process involves greater methodological challenges than
work on the tobacco industry, which is informed by
internal industry documents made public as a result of
litigation. These documents also provide information on
the activities of parts of the alcohol industry, which have
been found to work closely withTTCs [9,10]. Research on
the alcohol industry and other industries impacting
public health and society usually relies upon publicly
available documents, such as those submitted to govern-
ment consultations, and interviews with key players in
the policy process. The latter can involve both current
and former ministers, members of parliament, civil serv-
ants, public health advocates and industry actors. These
interviews can investigate the roles corporations play in
the policy process, the extent to which their input is
sought by government and the different avenues they
pursue in order to represent their interests, as well as
informing evaluations of the success of industry policy
influencing activities. Such an approach is methodologi-
cally challenging as interviewees may not wish to reveal
important information and/or seek to persuade the inter-
viewer as to the interpretation of data. Careful triangula-
tion of interviews between different respondents and
with other data sources is thus required.
Following a review of the peer-reviewed literature, we
examined formal policy documents and undertook a
documentary analysis of industry submissions made
to the Scottish Government’s 2008 consultation on
ChangingScotland’sRelationshipwithAlcohol [11].Thiswas
the first governmental publication within the United
Kingdomtoadopt awhole populationapproach toalcohol
policy and as it was introduced by aminority government
it was highly likely to be particularly contested.This study
identified industrypositionsonpolicyproposals and inves-
tigated how research evidence was used in order to influ-
ence policy [11]. Subsequently, we completed 36 semi-
structured interviews, 22 of which were with industry
actors, defined as anyone directly involved in the produc-
tion, supply or sale of alcohol [12] or in representing those
interests. Respondents were identified through a stake-
holder analysis [13,14] and through snowball sampling,
and included representatives from all sectors of the
alcohol industry aswell as senior politicians, civil servants
and health advocates. Interviews were recorded, tran-
scribedandanalysed thematicallyusingNvivo software.A
more detailed account of the methodology employed can
be found elsewhere [15]. This paper offers an integrative
review of our main findings.
RESULTS
Strategic positioning and framing policy debates
Debates about policy depend on the framing of the
problem it is intended to address. Unsurprisingly, industry
actors attempted to frame the impact of alcohol on
society in keeping with their underlying corporate inter-
ests. They emphasized their economic importance (as
employers and through tax revenue generated) and
blamed sensationalist media for exaggerating the prob-
lems associated with their products [16]. Industry actors
claimed that themajority of the population drink respon-
sibly and that any new policies should be directed towards
an allegedly small, problematic minority. They empha-
sized individual responsibility, calling for increased edu-
cation and public information about harmful drinking
[16]. This narrative is not new [17].
Somewhat paradoxically, rejection of whole-popula-
tion interventions goes hand in hand with calls for a
change in the drinking culture. The alcohol problem
facing British society was framed predominantly in terms
of binge drinking, not themortality andmorbidity caused
by long-termheavydrinking [6,18].This framing invites a
multi-sectoral approach led by criminal justice rather
than health agencies, in line with the UK Government’s
current alcohol strategy [6,19]. It also ignores the wider
social problems created by alcohol, including the harms
caused to children and families [20].
While policy preferences vary between individual
companies, there is commonality in the positions adopted
and significant capacity for collective action [15]. This
began to change only when some form of price-based
intervention began to seem unavoidable in Scotland [21].
The industry framing of policy debates was communi-
cated both to policymakers and to the wider population
through sophisticated media campaigns in an attempt to
shape public opinion and the discursive environment in
which policy decisions were taken [21].
Industry actors emphasized their corporate social
responsibility (CSR) activities and their capacity for self-
regulation, positioning themselves as part of the solution
to alcohol-related harm, rather than the problem [22].
One former Public Health Minister described how part-
nership agreements are attractive to policymakers as they
avoid the costly and time-consuming processes of passing
and enforcing legislation [23]. Where self-regulation is
impossible, industry actors seek to integrate themselves
into the policy process so that policies are co-produced by
policymakers and corporate actors [24].
Industry actors claimed to be committed to evidence-
based policy [11], yet they consistently opposed the inter-
national research community consensus that the policies
most likely to be effective in reducing alcohol-related
problems in the population are increases in the price of
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alcohol, and restrictions on availability and marketing
[25]. Documentary submissions to the Scottish Govern-
ment consultation failed to engage with the research
literature in any depth, although made no shortage
of claims about it. This and other tactics in relation to
evidence are used by industry actors elsewhere [11,26–
28]. Strong evidence was misrepresented and weak evi-
dence promoted when comparisons were made with the
expert summary of the peer-reviewed literature [25].
Unsubstantiated claims were made about the adverse
effects of unfavoured policy proposals and advocacy of
policies favoured by industry was not supported by the
presentation of evidence [11].
Policy influencing activities
Lobbying, by the alcohol industry and other sectors,
is extensive. According to David Cameron, before he
became UK Prime Minister: ‘We all know how it works.
The lunches, the hospitality, the quiet word in your ear,
the ex-ministers and ex-advisers for hire, helping big busi-
ness find the right way to get its way’ [29]. A recent judi-
cial inquiry (by Lord Leveson) into the culture, practices
and ethics of the UK press has drawn attention to lobby-
ing via ‘the indefatigable use of textmessaging, email and
telephone’ (p. 1376 in [30]). Such views of lobbying are
widespread, yet there are few rigorous research studies of
lobbying on alcohol or other public health issues.
Key findings from our investigations of lobbying are
presented in Box 1 [23]. The dominant approach used
by the alcohol industry was to nurture and sustain
long-term relationships with policymakers, within which
subtle forms of influence were exercised. This reinforces,
and is reinforced by, the industry narrative that they are
key stakeholders in the policy process whose voices
should be heard.Where these long-term relationships fail
to secure a favourable regulatory environment, however,
industry actors will lobby key decision-makers forcefully
on an issue by issue basis, including both government
Ministers and opposition MPs/MSPs [23]. Where this
proves unsuccessful, they will pursue their interests
through other means, including threatening and con-
ducting legal challenges under national and interna-
tional law. This underlines a highly pragmatic approach
to policy influence in which long-term relationships
are favoured, but where the partnership approach is
abandoned if circumstances demand it.
Further evidence of this pragmatism lay in the ability
to co-ordinate policy influencing activities, despite the
commercial rivalries which exist [15]. Industry actors
often sought to influence policy though trade associa-
tions, although the largest corporations also represented
their own interests independently [15]. In Scotland
the campaign against MUP was led by the ScotchWhisky
Association, primarily to take advantage of the particular
economic importance of the whisky industry in Scotland
and the status of its product as a cultural icon [21].
Considerable time and other resources are expended
by industry actors in the ‘proactive influencing’ of policy,
as the Portman Group described it [23]. The personal
relationships cultivated are central to the success of these
influencing efforts [23]. Industry influence varies, partly
because policy environments facilitate the fostering of
these relationships in different ways and to different
degrees. Comparisons between Westminster and Edin-
burgh are instructive in this regard—see Box 2 [21]. In
the latter, a greater culture of openness and willingness
to engage with stakeholders has been observed [31,32].
The election for the first time since devolution of a Scot-
tish National Party (SNP) government not associated
with the Westminster political parties made MUP more
attainable [21]. The level of access afforded to public
health advocates by the new administration facilitated a
reframing of the policy debate and an openness to whole
population interventions such as MUP. Crucially, it dis-
rupted the existing, long-term relationships developed by
the alcohol industry with the UK-wide parties previously
in power. The industry approach of focusing their lobby-
ing efforts on these parties was successful until the SNP
gained a parliamentary majority in 2011 andmade MUP
a priority.
Box 1 Lobbying in the United Kingdom 2007–10:
alcohol industry actors
• Took a long-term relationship building approach
with key decision makers, based on the provision
of assistance and information and the promise
of delivering policy outcomes through co- and
self-regulatory regimes;
• engaged Members of Parliament from all parties,
civil servants, Ministers, Shadow Ministers and
special advisers through a range of different chan-
nels, including party conferences and Parliamen-
tary All Party Groups;
• enjoyed considerable access to policymakers at all
stages of the policymaking process, attending
regular meetings throughout the year;
• benefited from extensive informal personal contacts
in government;
• were consulted informally both before and after offi-
cial policy consultation events;
• were thus successful in positioning themselves as
key stakeholders in the policy process, who must
be consulted on policy developments as a matter
of course.
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DISCUSSION
This work confirms that transnational alcohol producers
and the large supermarkets have access to policy actors
in the United Kingdom at all levels of government and
throughout the policy process, including to opposition
parties. A Public Health Commission (PHC) established
by the Conservative Party in opposition during the
2007–10 study period formed the basis of the Public
Health Responsibility Deal which became central to the
subsequent UK government’s public health policy [33].
This institutionalizes the role of industry actors in UK
public health policy in an unprecedented way, enhancing
capacity to shape policy formulation and to deflect or
delay policies that are contrary to these vested interests.
Such developments call for a deeper understanding of
corporate strategy and tactics to investigate further how
this access is used to influence policy, and to assist the
development of better protection against the harms
caused to society by alcohol. The tobacco industry is well
established as a pioneer of corporate political strategies
[34], and much is now known about their activities
through court mandated disclosure of internal industry
documents in the United States. The tobacco and alcohol
industries are also not dissimilar, in that both are involved
in the legal production, distribution and retail of a drug
which is toxic, addictive and causes high levels of death
and disease (each being responsible for approximately
5–6% of the total global burden of disease [35]). They
also have histories of working together to avert policy
measures with capacity to address this situation (for
example on pricing and promotions) [9] and patterns of
co-ownership continue to exist [10,36].
Lessons learned about TTCs may provide new foci for
the study of corporate influence on public policy by
actors from other industries. For example, the stated goals
of industry CSR activities may differ greatly from corpo-
rations’ real aims and objectives. These may include
attempts to gain the legitimacy and access to policy-
makers which facilitate long-term relationship-building
[37]. Alcohol industry actors will also have learned from
the experience of TTCs, and it is interesting how closely
aligned in the United Kingdom between 2007 and 2010
were the producers and the big supermarkets in their
efforts to influence policy.
Similarly, where industry interests are significantly
harmed, or the partnership approach is rejected by
policymakers, alcohol industry actors have demonstrated
they are prepared to deploy more confrontational tactics
of the kind now routinely used by TTCs. This has been
seen in the period since our study. These include legal
challenges to policies, not only under domestic law, but at
European and global levels [e.g. disputeswithin theWorld
Trade Organization (WTO) for apparent violations of
trade law] [38,39]. The French Loi Evin restricting
alcohol advertising was tested earlier at European Union
(EU) level [40] and the UK and European arms of the
alcohol industry have mounted legal challenges to MUP
under EU single-market law [41]. Appeals under Euro-
pean law have the potential to delay the implementation
of MUP in Scotland (and by extension the rest of the
United Kingdom) for many years.
Thailand’s attempts to introduce graphic warning
labels on alcohol containers have been opposed by WTO
members, including the EU, as unnecessary restraints on
trade since 2010, in very similar ways to how Australia’s
cigarette plain packaging laws have been contested [42].
Such legal challenges and trade disputesmay bemounted
even when the companies concerned know that their
arguments have little basis in law [43]. The purpose is
often twofold: to exert a ‘chilling effect’ on other govern-
ments considering similar legislation and to delay the
implementation of legislation in the targeted country,
Box 2 How minimum unit pricing (MUP) gradually
gained support in the United Kingdom despite
alcohol industry opposition
• The election of the minority Scottish National
Party (SNP) administration in 2007 disrupted
longstanding relationships between industry actors
and Scottish Ministers.
• Despite continued access to decision-makers by
industry actors, public health advocates helped the
Scottish Government change the terms of the
debate on alcohol problems and their solutions.
• Industry lobbying adapted to the political land-
scape, focusing instead on opposition Members of
the Scottish Parliament, backed up by an extensive
media campaign against MUP.
• These tactics succeeded initially in stopping the
passage of the measures through the Scottish Par-
liament in 2010 but they were later passed by a
majority SNP Government after the 2011 Scottish
Election.
• The SNP’s policy moved MUP up the agenda else-
where in the United Kingdom. It was later included
in the UK Government’s alcohol strategy for
England, although not implemented.
• Industry actors see UK policy as particularly impor-
tant for the effects it could have on regulation and
corporate strategy in emerging markets such as
China, undermining arguments for market liberali-
zation there.
• Implementation of MUP in Scotland has been
delayed by industry legal challenges.
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during which period the companies concerned can con-
tinue to promote their products without the hindrance
of the impending regulation. The time and expense
necessitated by such legal cases, while affordable for
large transnational corporations, can be a very real deter-
rent for governments, especially those of low-income
countries.
It is obvious that tensions with policymakers may
arise when profit is pursued through the sale of products
which cause health or social problems [28]. The handling
of these tensions is a core component of corporate strat-
egy [44–46], and lobbying is an important centrally
directed activity in large corporations [24]. The pragma-
tism we identified provides further evidence that the par-
ticular tactics employed by corporate actors develop over
time in relation to both the degrees and types of regula-
tion being considered by policymakers and the policy
environment in question [46]. At times, this may include
attempts to shift decision-making to venues—at the
subnational, national or supranational levels—in which
they are most effectively able to influence policy. In Scot-
land, attempts by certain actors to refocus debates onto
taxation as opposed to MUP can be seen as an attempt to
shift policymaking to Westminster (where tax policy for
the entire United Kingdom is set), as it was felt that the
government there was more sympathetic to commercial
interests [21,23]. In addition, corporate strategy adopted
in one location may also be influenced by global consid-
erations rather than domestic priorities. Opposition to
MUP in Scotland appeared to be driven as much by
concerns about its impact on attempts to gain market
access and ensure favourable regulatory environments
in emerging economies as by domestic concerns [21].
These considerations indicate the potential value of
developing conceptual frameworks thatwill guide further
study. For example, the political science literature on
multi-level governance [47] appears to have clear rel-
evance to the study of the alcohol industry. Jahiel [48]
and colleagues [28] posit a more epidemiologically based
model in which corporate profit-making is linked to indi-
vidual health and social consequences, that has been
applied to alcohol. In both cases, specific lobbying activi-
ties can be understood or situated within larger corporate
political strategies.
The ability of policymakers to manage corporate
influence in the public interest is profoundly challenged
by globalization. According to Casswell [1]: ‘the global
alcohol industry is engaged in a race against time, to
ensure the diffusion and normalization of drinking in
emerging markets before governments and civil society
are able to ensure adequate policies to limit the spread of
heavy drinking and alcohol-related harm in the popula-
tion’. An analysis of four draft national alcohol policy
documents in sub-Saharan African countries found them
to be almost identical inwording and structure and impli-
cated one particular corporation (SAB-Miller) in their
construction [7]. The policy documents included promo-
tion of the health benefits of alcohol, which are unlikely
to occur widely in countries where average life expec-
tancy is lower than the ages at which any such benefits
may be expected [7]. The potential contribution to global
health that high-income countries can make by address-
ing vested interests should not be underestimated.
Corporate lobbying presents formidable challenges for
public policies world-wide and comparative analyses of
industries and countries will be important, as well as
studies of the changing policy contexts faced by the
alcohol industry over time within a given country. Corpo-
rate influence is exercised through many channels. Our
study suggests that personal relationships established
and nurtured over the long term are key and they are
utilized at all stages of the policy process, including at the
highest levels of government by corporations with vested
interests in policy outcomes. Our investigations suggest
that there is much more work to be carried out in uncov-
ering the mechanisms, as well as establishing the extent,
of corporate influence on policies within as well as
between countries. It is unclear how the apparent success
of corporate influence on alcohol policy in the United
Kingdom [6,19] compares with other areas important to
health, such as food. As Lord Leveson put it, corporate
lobbying entails ‘placing the conduct of public policy
issues outside the mechanisms of transparency, account-
ability and public record’ (p. 1405 in [30]). As such, it
‘cannot but give rise to perceptions and questions which
are corrosive to public trust and confidence’ (p. 1405)
[30]. This provides a very useful guide to what public
policymakers across the world should do about corporate
lobbying. Transparency in all aspects of lobbying, includ-
ing money spent on it, should be a key issue for alcohol
policy reform. Public policy will benefit from careful
studies of how policy is actually made, and the support
of policymakers is essential for this. We also need
more assertive promotion of the ideas that protecting
and promoting population health and the interests
of society are core duties of government, if effective
alcohol policies are to be introduced.
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